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Abstract 
 
Vietnam has been implementing a large number of poverty reduction programs. This study 
aims to assess the targeting and implementation of the National Targeted Programmes for 
Poverty Reduction in Vietnam. It find that the effectiveness of the programme has been 
constrained by limited capacities both in terms of limited institutional capacities, 
inadequate financial, management and reporting systems and the capacity of officials at 
various levels. As a result there has been a lack of participatory and effective programme 
design. There was insufficiently decentralized and participatory implementation and 
management, including monitoring and financial management needed to effectively target 
poor households and allocate financial resources to provincial levels in a transparent 
manner. There hasn’t been a clear process to regularly monitor progress as well as 
objectively assess the impact of the targeted programmes on household well-being.  
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1. Introduction 
 
The first national target programme for Hunger Eradication Poverty Reduction (NTP-
HEPR) was launched by the Government (GoV) in 1998 and included several policies and 
targeted projects on health care, education and a social safety net for the poor (Government 
of Vietnam 1998a, 1998b). In 2001, the programme was merged with the Employment 
Creation Programme to become the national target programme for HEPR-JC with 12 
targeted sub-programmes and social support policies. The programme has had a significant 
impact on poverty reduction in Vietnam. Applying an internationally defined total poverty 
line the incidence of poverty in Viet Nam steadily declined from around 58% in 1993 to 
37% in 1998 to 29% in 2002 and to 24.1% in 2004. The proportion of population below the 
food poverty line also declined from 25% in 1993 to 11% by 2002 and to 7.8% in 20041.  
 
However, the effectiveness of the programme has been constrained by limited capacities 
both in terms of limited institutional capacities, inadequate financial, management and 
reporting systems and the capacity of officials at various levels. As a result there has been a 
lack of participatory and effective programme design. There was insufficiently 
decentralized and participatory implementation and management, including monitoring and 
financial management needed to effectively target poor households and allocate financial 
resources to provincial levels in a transparent manner. There hasn’t been a clear process to 
regularly monitor progress as well as objectively assess the impact of the targeted 
programmes on household well-being. Officials lacked the capacity and willingness to 
facilitate peoples' participation and build their capacities to monitor and supervise the 
implementation of the programme. 
 
The preparation of guidelines for the next stage of the NTP-HEPR will start in early 2006. 
This provides an excellent opportunity to ensure that guidelines are developed that resolve 
those issues that limited the impact of the previous phase.   
 
Analysis has now been carried out of two of the NTPs to establish whether they fulfil the 
concrete requirements for Finnish targeted budget support. The following report assesses 
key aspects of phase one of National Targeted Programme for Poverty Reduction (NTP-
HEPR or NTP-MOLISA) and outlines recommendations.2 
 
                                                 
1
 VHLSS, 2004 
2
 Evaluation of national poverty reduction program can be found in Nguyen (2003, 2005), and Nguyen et al. 
(2005). 
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The remaining report has eight sections as follows: 
1. Description of planned components of NTP-HEPR 2006-2010 
2. The targeting of assistance to the poor  
3. Effectiveness and efficiency of programme components 
4. Administration arrangements and communes as project owners 
5. Legal and administrative guidance on the implementation of Grassroots Democracy 
and transparent financial practices at the commune level 
6. The geographic / ethnic coverage and gender orientation of  NTP-HEPR 
7. The quality of the monitoring arrangements 
8. Conclusions 
 
 
2.   Description of planned components of NTP-HEPR 
 
The principles for the implementation of NTP-HEPR during the next 6 years are: 
• Poverty reduction is a main priority in socio-economic development. Policies 
are focused on poor people, poor communes, and creating the capacities and 
commitment to improve poverty reduction. 
• Use the MDGs as a guide for poverty reduction, social equality and sustainable 
development.  
• Party and State guidelines and view-points must be institutionalized into 
mechanisms, policies and annual plans. All resources of society must be 
mobilized in order to realize the objectives and targets of the poverty reduction 
program for 2006-2010, with the primary focus on the most difficult areas and 
chronic poor.  
 
The overall objectives of NTP-HEPR are: 
• Reduce poor household rate from 26% in 2005 to 15% in 2010 (within 5 years, 
reduce poor household rate by 38% according to the new poverty line) 
• Improve living standards for poor households to bridge the income gap, rural-urban 
gap, lower area-mountainous area gap and gap between poor and rich household. 
 
NTP-HEPR shall be implemented nationwide with the following general targets: 
• Increasing incomes of the poor 
• Improving access to basic social services for the poor 
• Increase awareness and capacity on PR. 
 
 4
The NTP will focus on five policy areas and include eight sub-programmes.  
Policy areas include:  
1. Preferential credit for poor households. 
2. Access to cultivation land for poor ethnic households.  
3. Health care for the poor. 
4. Education for the poor. 
5. Housing and clean water for the poor 
 
Sub-programmes include:  
1. Agricultural-forestry-fishery extension 
2. Community Development Fund  
3. Vocational training for the poor 
4. Capacity building for poverty reduction officers at all levels  
5. Support for the replication of poverty reduction models 
6. Institutional development in poor communes 
7. Dissemination of information about poverty reduction 
8. Monitoring and Evaluation 
 
 
Comparisons between NTP-HEPR 2001-2005 and NTP 2006-2010 
1. Capacity development  
a. During NTP-HEPR 2001-2005 less than one percent of the total budget was allocated to 
capacity development for all levels.   
b. The NTP-HEPR 2006-2010 project document outlines targets with budget that will 
improve the capacity of poverty reduction officials at all levels. By 2007, 100% of 
commune poverty reduction officials will be trained in poverty assessment, project 
management and participatory methods. By 2010, 95% of village leaders will have received 
training in these methods and approaches.   
 
2. Coordination of national and donor projects  
a. During NTP-HEPR 2001-2005, the lack of coordination of the different national and 
donor programmes and projects resulted in wasted resources, overlap and opportunities for 
leakage.  
b. NTP-HEPR 2006-2010 outlines a comprehensive strategy to develop mechanisms and 
institutional arrangements to facilitate the coordination of the different programmes and 
projects. The new programme promotes a mechanism to strengthen the coordination 
between central and provincial levels with the Chairman of the PPC having a central role. 
Decentralisation to commune level is a main focus in the new programme.  It also 
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recommends that projects should be rearranged to improve efficiency. For example, 
essential infrastructure construction should be transferred to SEDEMA and sedentarisation 
and resettlement to MoLISA.  
 
3. Monitoring and Evaluation  
a. During NTP-HEPR 2001-2005, there was no M&E conducted, which resulted in low 
performance of investments and leakage problems.   
b. The NTP-HEPR 2006-2010 programme outlines a mechanism to carry out a M&E 
system at all levels with a dedicated budget. It also develops standards, indicators and 
measures so that the system can be consistently applied in all provinces.  
 
4. Information Flow 
a. During NTP-HEPR 2001-2005, officials and the community lacked access to data and 
information on the programme, which limited the access of the poor to socials services.   
b. The NTP-HEPR 2006-2010 programme develops a mechanism from central to village 
level to ensure the community understands what support the programme can provide and 
how to access this support. The information mechanism will also be used to transfer 
information about issues such as budget, technical options and access to credit. It is that by 
increasing the knowledge of the community and developing transparency leakage will be 
reduced.  
 
5. Mobilisation of resources and local participation  
a. During NTP-HEPR 2001-2005 no records were kept of local contributions to services 
and construction, which led to low contribution rates and leakage problems. The 
community was often not part of the decision-making process.  
b. The programme document for NTP-HEPR 2006-2010 outlines a comprehensive plan to 
combine socialisation (the mobilisation of resources from all members in the community) 
with the improved utilisation of demand-responsive approaches.  
 
 
3. The targeting of assistance to the poorest (poverty impact) 
 
Results from the Vietnam Household Living Standard Survey in 2002-2004 show that the 
NTP-HEPR programme targeted poor households quite well in 2002, but poorly in 2004. 
Some sub-programmes in the NTP-HEPR, namely agriculture tax exemption, education fee 
exemption, healthcare insurance provision, housing supports were targeted very well to 
poor households in 2002 (Table 1 through 5). For all these programs, more than 60% of the 
beneficiary households were actually poor. However, the coverage of the programme was 
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quite low in 2002. For example, among poor households, only 10.2% and 5.5% of the 
households received healthcare insurance and preferential credit, respectively.  
 
Also according to the results presented in the tables, the coverage of the programme 
increased in 2004, but the targeting rate was reduced. More seriously, the percentage of the 
beneficiary households who were non-poor was higher than the percentage of the 
beneficiary poor households for the education fees, healthcare insurance and credit sub-
programmes. These sub-programmes targeted the non-poor household rather than the poor. 
One explanation might be that there were households who escaped poverty during 2002-
2004 but still received support from NTP-HEPR. Thus the coverage of the programme 
increased due to the decrease in the number of poor households, but  the targeting rate of 
poor households decreased.   
   
The percentage of poor agricultural households who accessed agricultural extension was 
also low in 2004. Only 36.4% of poor agricultural households attended meetings on 
agricultural issues, and only 7.8% of  households to whom the agricultural extensionists 
visited were provided knowledge on agriculture that was used. 
 
At the commune level, Table 10 presents the percentage of communes which had projects 
during the 2002-2004 period. The table indicates that the percentage of communes with 
projects was higher for poor communes, but the difference in this percentage between poor 
and non-poor communes was not high.  
 
Tables 12, 13 and 14 estimate the change in expenditure per capita and poverty rate during 
2002-2004 for the participants in several NTP-HEPR sub-programmes using panel data 
VHLSS 2002-2004. Table 12 estimates the change in expenditure per capita for the 
households who received support from the programme in 2003 by poverty status in the year 
2002. It is interesting that the poor who received programme support experienced a higher 
percentage of increase in expenditure per capita than the non-poor beneficiary households. 
Although the estimates do not reflect the causal impact of the NTP-HEPR programme, they 
are good news that on average the poor who participated in the programme experienced an 
increase in living standards.  
 
Table 13 and 14 indicates the change in expenditure per capita and poverty rate during the 
period 2002-2004 for households who received programme support and those who did not. 
It shows that both recipients and non-recipients experienced increases in expenditure per 
capita and a decrease in poverty reduction.  
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Table 15 and 16 estimate changes in commune characteristics during 2002-2004 for poor 
and non-poor communes. It indicates that on average both poor and non-poor communes 
experienced improvement in commune infrastructure, schools, and non-farm employment 
opportunities. However there were still 7.6% of poor communes without electricity, and 
0.2% of communes without any healthcare center.   
 
From the statistics it is difficult to determine the causal impact of the NTP-HEPR 
programme. Table 17 indicates the main reasons for improvement in living standards in 
communes from as assessment of commune authorities in 2004. It shows that the local 
authorities in 65.6% and 20.2% of communes said that infrastructure and social policies 
including healthcare and education were main reasons for the improvement in living 
standards of commune people. This is evidence that the NTP-HEPR has contributed to 
social development. However the magnitude of this contribution is not clear, and 
measurement of this magnitude should be determined to help improve the impact of the 
new programme.   
 
Fieldwork and research indicated that officials from People’s Committees at different levels 
assessed the targeting of NTP-HEPR to date as having varied results3. These include: 
• The programme has assisted in a general improvement in the wellbeing of the poor 
– this is the result of a trickle-down effect with wealthier households benefiting 
more than the poor from economic growth. 
• It is difficult to get an accurate picture of the poverty situation because of distortions 
in the reporting procedures in the administration system and the unreliability of 
statistics from the communes, districts and province.  
• Current HEPR planning activities and programs at all levels are developed without 
the support of reliable data. 
• The impact of HEPR is not consistent – many poor households miss out on state 
assistance. 
• The implementation of the HEPR program is still predominantly top-down and it is 
difficult to change this system. 
• The continued use of planned targets and quotas for HEPR is inefficient and misses 
many of the poor. 
• Officials often do not have the capacity to conduct effective targeting of the poor or 
develop strategies to help them. 
                                                 
3
 Information for this section was drawn from fieldwork and research conducted by this mission and previous work 
conducted by team members during the last two years.  
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• Programs to help the poor are not effectively coordinated, which results in a waste 
of resources and inefficient implementation. 
• Possible gains from land distribution have reached their limit and future 
effectiveness of the HEPR programme would depend on a more participatory and 
inclusive approach. 
• In sectors addressed by NTP-HEPR, education attendance has improved and credit 
programs have helped many poor households but the loans available to the poor are 
too small to develop production to a level where it would have a sustainable impact 
on poverty reduction, and improve healthcare for the poor.  
 
Through a similar process, officials also identified the following range of cross-cutting 
poverty issues that they believe NTP-HEPR was not able to address: 
• Increasing landlessness. 
• The low quality of public services, such as education and health. 
• The problem of overcoming debt for the poor. 
• The specific problems facing the ethnic minority groups. 
• Developing off-farm employment.  
• Access to secondary education for both females and males. 
• Water quality problems, increased environmental pollution. 
• Communes where strong economic growth did not result in poverty reduction. e.g. 
shrimp raising.  
• The poor remaining psychologically dependent on social assistance.    
• The vulnerability of the poor to economic shocks. 
 
A synthesis of information from a range of sources including fieldwork and research 
conducted during this mission provides the following opinions of the poor regarding the 
targeting of NTP-HEPR:  
• The poor assess NTP-HEPR as externally imposed and they do not feel a part of this 
system; that is, even though they receive assistance they may not be aware of, or 
participate in, the processes that decide the distribution of the social support. 
• The poor do not understand the selection criteria for NTP-HEPR assistance. 
• Because the poor do not participate in decisions they feel disenfranchised; this is 
reinforced by the discretionary power of officials to distribute assistance. For 
example, sometimes health cards are taken away from poor households and 
reallocated to wealthier households. 
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• The poor seldom complain about HEPR services because they are unsure of the 
result – perhaps they will be penalized for complaining, and may not receive 
assistance in the next round. 
• The poor realize that the access and quality of services provided is limited, but 
accept all the assistance they can get. 
• The poor understand that access to the NTP-HEPR is often dependent on power 
relations with local officials – the result is that non-poor households sometimes 
have access to HEPR resources. 
• The poor assess NTP-HEPR as providing temporary relief from a crisis situation but 
as not helping them to escape poverty in a sustainable way. 
• The landless poor do not feel that the NTP-HEPR responds to their situation – they 
often migrate to other provinces looking for work where they will not be registered 
residents, and so become ineligible for support from the programme. 
• Women feel they are disadvantaged by some conditions in the programme – women 
usually do not have access to loans unless the land user registration is in their name, 
which is often not the case (despite legislation requiring both male and female heads 
of household are registered as owners in the red books). 
• The poor in remote rural areas are not familiar with the support provided by NTP-
HEPR – they are rarely visited by local HEPR officials and therefore are not 
recorded on official lists to receive support. 
• The unemployed and underemployed often state that the NTP-HEPR did not 
provide appropriate skills training for the job market. 
• Ethnic communities consider that their children lack access to quality education, 
and that language barriers restrict their progress. 
 
In the box below is an overview of the experiences of the poor and the non-poor in their 
ability to access and utilise NTP-HEPR services. It suggests that the poor have been able to 
make use of some specific services but that their experience has been mixed and some sub-
programmes have not achieved their aim of targeting the poor. 
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Targeting of NTP-HEPR Policies and Services in the Mekong Delta 
Policies or 
services 
The poor The non-poor 
Micro credit Receive small loans from the HEPR 
program, not enough for investment 
(Table 6) 
Take larger loans with collateral 
from banks. 
Agricultural 
extension 
Difficult to benefit from because of 
limited means of production   
Relatively easy to access and to take 
advantage 
Irrigation Limited direct benefits for those with 
little land, but large indirect benefits 
through more hired labour by better-
off households. 
Direct benefits, larger the more land 
the household has.  
Infrastructure 
development 
 
Few have the money to get water and 
electricity meters installed; at the same 
time have  less in terms of equipment 
and activities requiring an intensive 
use of electricity or water  
More direct benefits in terms of 
entertainment, clean water use, 
business and production 
development 
Small- business 
projects 
Limited benefits because of 
ineffective implementation  
Do not benefit because they already 
have stable production activities  
Agricultural tax 
exemptions  
Little benefit for those with no land or 
little land 
Considerable direct benefit 
Health support 
policies  
Health insurance cards make a 
considerable difference  
No sizeable benefits  
Education support 
policies  
Support with textbooks appreciated, 
but secondary-level exemptions not 
considered useful as the poor rarely 
get to that level. 
No major benefit but it is still 
possible to send children to school  
Housing support A few people resettled to residential 
clusters or receiving support for house 
repairs. 
No benefit  
Culture and 
information 
support  
Benefited, but with little interest  Benefited 
Relief assistance 
programs 
Being prioritized for relief assistance 
in flooding seasons  
Able to cope with floods and make 
use of improved soil fertility  
Emergency relief 
for risk reduction  
Prioritized Not prioritized  
Welfare policies 
for migrants and 
women  
Prioritized Not applicable  
Source: Mekong Delta Poverty Analysis, 2004 
 
The application of the new, raised poverty line4, has implications for NTP-HEPR, as it has 
the potential to dramatically increase the number of households supported by the 
                                                 
4
 The new poverty line is 200,000 VND for rural poor and 260,000 for urban poor. 
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programme, yet there has not be a proportional increase in funding. Consequently the very 
poor may receive less support. It is not yet clear how this issue will be addressed. 
4. The efficiency and effectiveness of the programme components: Emphasis on 
Community Development Fund and Vocational Training 
 
Community Development Fund  
The main objective of the Community Development Fund (CDF) of NTP-HEPR is to 
support the development of infrastructure for production and livelihood improvement in 
communes with special difficulties in coastal and island areas, and poor communes. This 
infrastructure will significantly contribute to the poverty reduction in these areas. The CDF 
will target 500 poor communes, which will be selected by the provincial level using a 
criteria established by MoLISA. Activities will include capacity development for provinces 
in poverty assessment and commune selection, infrastructure for village level to develop 
production and livelihoods, extension and the application of modern technology, capacity 
development of village leaders and the community, vocational training, support developing 
village development plans, household access to credit for production and maintenance and 
support for vulnerable households so that they do not fall into poverty. The implementation 
of CDF will follow the principles: public access to all information, grassroots democracy, 
local ownership and transparency. The community will identify projects, monitor 
implementation and manage the 200 million VND5 allocated to each commune.  
Provinces will have the main responsibility in selecting communes for support through the 
sub-programme and submit an investment plan to GoV for 2006-2010.  They will be 
required to prepare a strategic plan for implementation for the 2006-2010 period to ensure 
that poor communes access the fund and also exit strategies when they no longer qualify for 
the programme. Provinces will issue regulations so that commune level will be the 
investment owner and village level responsible for maintenance and operations of 
investments. During implementation, provinces will create the conditions so that 
“communes have construction projects and at the same time people have jobs and 
income’’. Communes will need to balance their budget and mobilize resources from all 
sectors in the community including the private sector, mass organizations and state 
enterprises. Essentially, a guiding principle will be “the people carry out investment 
activities, and Government supports”. The community will have responsibility to 
contribute resources for the maintenance of investments.  
As with SEDEMA, there are clear issues regarding true decentralisation to commune level 
(discussed in report 1). To date, provinces and districts are loath to allow communes to 
make decisions and manage implementation, particularly when it comes to infrastructure 
                                                 
5
 Some recent reports have this figure at 700 million VND.  
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developments. This is partly due to the oft-repeated truism that there is a lack of capacity at 
commune level. But it is also partly due to the opportunity for financial gain that 
contracting of infrastructure works provides. Certainly there are costs involved with 
building capacities and supporting commune-managed contracting and implementation. 
However, there are also savings, as it is in the interest of the community to closely monitor 
works if they have selected them and are ‘paying for them’ themselves. And in the long 
run, there are improvements in both effectiveness and efficiency. 
Also as with the SEDEMA, it is difficult to assess the economic efficiency of the 
programme components because of the lack of access to commune, district and provincial 
budgets. The issue of the additionality of donor funding is also difficult to assess, given the 
tendency for fungibility. 
 
Vocational Training  
The main objective is to train poor people to have the necessary skills for stable 
employment and income generation, through short-term vocational training courses, which 
help them to seek for jobs in enterprises (especially small and medium scale enterprises). 
This also will assist the poor to access the city labour markets (e.g. factories in HCM City) 
or overseas labour markets and develop self-employment opportunities. Remittances sent 
back to poor family members and remote areas are an important source of income. The 
target of this sub-programme are poor youth, the poor in densely populated areas, the poor 
in areas that lack land for cultivation or in areas affected by changes in land-use such as 
from agricultural production to industrialization and urbanization. Provinces will 
implement activities including an assessment of the demand for vocational training by the 
poor and develop training plans. The Department of Labour, Veterans and Social Affairs will 
organize short-term vocational training courses appropriate so that the poor can develop their 
own employment opportunities. Plans will be submitted to the PPC for approval and 
implementation guidelines. Priorities in vocational training will be supporting the poor access 
job placements in industrial zones, enterprises, and for labour export. Provinces will link 
vocational training with job placement and provide trainees with credit and free access to 
employment introduction organisations. The provincial level will also provide equipment 
and facilities for district vocational training centres. Enterprises and organisations that 
provide vocational training for the poor, and then provide them with stable employment for 
over two years, will receive a grant equal to State expenditure for providing such training. 
To ensure the effectiveness of vocational training, trainees will contribute 10% of training 
fee, but the poor in ethnic minorities will be exempt from charges. It is expected that by the 
year 2010, 450,000 of the poor would have been provided with vocational training and 
immediate access to employment, jobs in enterprises, cooperatives, farms, plantations, 
economic zones and foreign labour markets.  
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According to Table 10, 22.4% of poor communes had access to the employment generation 
programme in 2004, while this figure for non-poor communes was 27.3%. During 2002-
2004 the off-farm employment opportunities increased (Table 17). In 2002, 33.1% of poor 
communes had nearby off-farm enterprises or traditional village production, and this rate 
increased to 40.1% in 2004. The average number of commune labourers working in these 
enterprises also increased rapidly from 23.1 to 142.2 persons/enterprise during this period.       
 
Other Policies and Projects in NTP-HEPR 2006-2010 
The new programme includes a range of policies and projects that are focused on creating 
the conditions so that the poor can develop their own way to escape poverty. Each region 
has different socio-economic and geographical conditions and each household has a 
particular set of circumstances that it needs to overcome to improve its poverty situation. In 
this way poverty reduction reduces the vulnerability of the poor and is sustainable.  
 
The preferential credit scheme will priorities access to credit for women, households 
supporting disabled and ethnic minorities. Credit will be available to develop production 
and small business, improved housing in flood areas. On average each loan will be 4-7 
million VND with a maximum of 15 million VND and a maximum period of five years. 
Loan procedures for each household will be completed within 15 days. To support 
vulnerable households, households just over the poverty line will be able to access loans for 
a period of 2 years. Implementation of this policy will result in incremental increases in the 
loan limit for poor households, based on their production needs. It links borrowing with 
savings to decease the risk for poor households, and will gradually raise borrowing interest 
rates and lower the state subsidy. It is also planned to expand access to preferential credit to 
vulnerable households just over the poverty line. 
 
The policy for providing productive land for poor ethnic households will continue the 
implementation of Decision 134. Transfer of this land is forbidden. Due to the scarcity of 
productive land, the policy will outline mechanisms to provide crop varieties and livestock 
breeds for ethnic households and develop the sustainable use of the forest. Revisions to the 
health policy will include a Health Insurance Fund for the poor with clear guidelines and 
regulations for payments. The value of the health insurance card for the poor will increase 
to 60,000 VND/person/year. The Health Insurance Fund will be used to support the poor 
with serious ailments that require high cost medical treatment so that they do not need to 
borrow funds or sell assets, which would push them further into poverty. The education 
policy will continue to assist the poor with better quality and equal access to education 
services. The policy will support access by the poor to public and non-public schools. The 
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new policy on housing and clean water for the poor will enhance the principles embodied in 
socialization to expand the coverage of the housing policy. The new policy will assign to 
the chair of the PPC the responsibility to coordinate the different programmes that have 
sections devoted to improving housing, and effectively manage these resources. 
 
To support the implementation of these policies there are a range of sub-programmes6. 
Agricultural-forestry-fishery extension will continue to develop extension models that were 
effectively implemented during 2001-2005. Improve the cooperation between extension 
units and mass organizations, especially in ethnic minority areas. Revise some policies to 
help poor households in applying new technologies into production and business activities. 
Establish mechanisms to provide new breeds and production materials for the poor.  
Capacity building for poverty reduction officers at all levels will develop materials and 
content and expenditure norms for training activities for HEPR officials so that they are 
consistent across all levels of government and in all provinces.  Developing capacity of 
ethnic staff in charge of NTP-HEPR is a priority. Support for the replication of poverty 
reduction models will develop expenditure norms and materials outlining practical models 
for the replication of effective NTP-HEPR models. The sub-programme will focus on 
replicating models in extremely difficult areas and develop linkages between enterprises 
and poor households and poor communes. It will develop a process where models can be 
regularly revised to ensure their practicability. Institutional development in poor communes 
will strengthen coordination mechanisms to avoid overlap during implementation of the 
different national target programmes and other programmes.  It will also promote the 
implementation of Grassroots Democracy in NTP-HEPR activities to facilitate people’s 
participation in the implementation process. Dissemination of information about poverty 
reduction will develop specific activities at different levels of government to disseminate 
information about effective poverty reduction. It will also develop a mechanism so that 
information about NTP-HEPR is integrated into other programmes and projects. 
Monitoring and evaluation will develop a set of indicators for the monitoring and 
evaluation of programme activities. It will also develop expenditure norms, criteria, 
definitions to ensure consistent application of the system.  
 
Problem analysis on the concrete requirements for Finnish targeted budget support. 
The new programme document has outlined measures that respond to many of the problems 
encountered during the previous phase. Targeted budget support will require that the 
process to resolve these problems is started in early 2006.  This will require integrated 
                                                 
6
 The Commune Development Fund and vocational training sub-programmes are outlined above.  
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implementation guidelines, so that provinces can develop regulations to carry out the 
programme.  
 
General guidelines will be required for:   
• Coordination of all policies and sub-programmes by a single agency in MoLISA. 
This agency will need the capacity to manage this responsibility and for effective 
strategic planning.  
• The development of an effective coordination network from central to village level 
with at least minimum capacity.  
• Budget allocations to correspond with implementation guidelines.  
• Detailed procurement policy with independent audits 
• Detailed operations and management policy 
• Baseline survey  
• PAR at commune level, especially the ‘one door’ policy so that the poor can access 
credit and other resources 
• Labour contributions that clearly outline the prioritisation of the poor  
• Information flows to village level so that the community knows about issues such as 
budget and technical choices.  
• Improved data storage and planning processes at commune level  
• Improved capacity of officials in poverty targeting,  assessment and project 
management  
 
Community Development Fund 
• Capacity development at provincial, district and commune level to improve  for 
commune selection  
• A transparent process for commune selection  
• A mechanism for expenditure tracking to reduce leakage issues 
• Improved local participation in the selection of investments and clear 
implementation guidelines for socialisation 
• Mechanism that clearly outlines labour contributions and gives priority to the poor 
for paid labour.  
• Information flow that outlines the rights of the community in HEPR service 
provision and technical options.  
• An effective monitoring and evaluation system with budget allocation; collection of 
baseline data  
 
Vocational Training 
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• Strategic planning and coordination of materials to ensure consistent application of 
the sub-programme in all provinces.   
• Development of clear delivery mechanisms  at provincial level to ensure effective 
training is carried out at district, commune and village levels 
• Monitoring and evaluation system for quality control and to ensure training is 
relevant to the requirements of the market; collection of baseline data.  
 
5. The administrative arrangements for execution, especially the conditions for 
communes to act as project owners  
 
There has been a significant lack of community participation demonstrated to date in the 
planning process for selecting, implementing, supervising construction and monitoring 
NTP-HEPR activities. Community meetings at village and commune levels were organised 
regularly but their influence into final decisions about investment priorities was low. The 
content of meetings was limited to issues that were of direct interest.  
 
People will participate more actively if the project or activity affects their lives and 
livelihoods in the short-term, and when their labour or financial contribution is required. 
Meeting participation, including the gender breakdown, isn’t recorded in any reports. In 
practice, listing of necessary infrastructure works and prioritisation is prepared at the start 
of the 5 year planning period. These plans are generally not revised during the 
implementation of the programme. From field research, it was identified that changes to 
plans can only be made at provincial level. Requests by communes for support under NTP-
HEPR must be within the provincial master plan, if they are not, they will not receive 
approval. In addition, commune officials lack the capacity to coordinate the different HEPR 
activities in national and provincial programmes.  
 
In order for the poorest or most disadvantaged members of a community to influence 
decisions about NTP-HEPR activities, they need to even know that the possibility exists, 
how it could help them directly and why it is worthwhile for them to speak up. Very often 
the poorest members of the community are women and ethnic minorities – the very people 
least likely to actively participate in public meetings. Targeting has been done on the basis 
of the ‘poor list’ and at the discretion of the commune and district. 
 
In most communes, there is inadequate equipment for data management, monitoring and 
reporting. Very limited records exist in the commune and less still at village level. Many 
communes don’t have computer, not even a typewriter and some are not connected to the 
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telephone network. In order to prepare reports they must travel down to district town and 
use their computers. This would limit their reporting ability as investment owners. An 
additional problem is the present reporting system is inefficient and not suitable for 
implementing principles such as transparency and accountability. 
 
Commune officials in poor communes had low educational degrees. Table 18 and 19 
estimate the educational level of the chairman and deputy chairman in commune people 
committees using commune panel data 2002-2004. In 2002, there were about 15% of 
communes in which the chairman had just the primary school level. Indeed, in these 
communes, it is important that the chair receives capacity development to ensure transition 
to commune ownership of programme activities. In 2002, only 44% of commune chairs had 
an upper-secondary school degree and above. However the education of the chairs has 
increased rather quickly during 2002-2004. The percentage of chairs with upper-secondary 
education and above increased by 12.8 percentage points to 56.8%. The education level of 
the deputy chairman was similar to that of the chairman on average during 2002-2004. 
There were still a large proportion of deputy chairman, at 45.2%, who had not completed 
the upper-secondary school.      
 
For NTP-HEPR 2006-10, set targets have been established for commune ownership, local 
participation and improved service delivery. However, there is no strategic plan to improve 
these areas, and there is a lack of political commitment at provincial and district level to 
implement these measures. There is also a lack of incentives for control of decisions such 
as financial arrangements to be devolved to lower levels.  
 
To achieve these targets, MoLISA will need to develop its capacity for strategic planning, 
and develop clear policy and guidelines for programme implementation. It will need to 
define clearly at central and provincial levels what will be coordinated and what will be 
implemented and ensure that there are clear roles and responsibilities for each level.  
 
Key issues include:  
• A clear system of criteria or triggers is needed to establish when a commune has 
sufficient capacity to take over as owners, and a clear plan for how to get them to 
that point. 
• Clear definition on what investments are best managed by the commune and what 
by the district. Annual assessment and revisions to plans is important, as is genuine 
community participation. Any training on local consultation or participation within 
the capacity building structure should happen as soon as possible if it is to have an 
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impact on the 5 year plans. However, if there is a built in system to revise the plans 
annually this training could also be useful later. 
• Need for improved consultation and proactive attempts to increase the active 
participation of women and ethnic minorities. Membership targets could be 
established so that these groups hold positions on Boards. 
• Increased capacity building, including for village leaders, is required. Improved 
knowledge, skills and attitudes are needed in: 
• facilitation – improving inclusiveness and more participatory 
planning 
• communication and information dissemination 
• technical monitoring  
• budget and project financial management  
• analysis, monitoring and reporting  
• A list is needed of the required competencies/capacities at commune level – e.g. 
holding bank account, prior experience in supervising projects, list of required 
training, facilities such as computer etc. Capacity building courses can be designed 
to fill the gaps. This would present clearly to commune officials what will be 
required. 
• There is often overlapping of courses and providers. The regular provider is the 
provincial political training schools. However, the experience from donor funded 
projects is that it is difficult to influence the content of the training they provide, 
even if the donor is funding the course. There tends to be more focus on political 
orientation and less on the necessary practical skills.  
• The establishment of websites to improve access of training materials, courses etc. 
However, this needs to be carefully coordinated by MoLISA and a plan developed 
to improve the capacity and facilities at districts and commune levels so that they 
can benefit from the system.   
• Funds for capacity building in NTP-HEPR need to be significantly increased. 
• Capacity building needs to be targeted and practical.   
• Capacity building should not be seen as only training. Other aspects could be 
attitudinal change, institutional supports, equipment and horizontal learning via 
study tours, sharing of lessons learned via reports and brief publications, etc. 
• Study tours would be very beneficial for commune level people to districts where 
decentralisation to commune level has already taken place. Characteristically, there 
is probably more a lack of confidence rather than a lack of capacity. Horizontal 
linkages and experiential learning will help build confidence. 
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6. The legal and administrative guidance for using grassroots democracy principles 
and transparent financial practices at the commune level  
 
Principles such as democracy, transparency and accountability, were not well understood 
by either officials or the wider community during the previous phase. This had a significant 
impact on the provision of services. For example, targeting of the healthcare card was often 
“random” and many poor households, such as households in remote areas, missed out. The 
poor typically did not participate in the selection process to decide who received a 
healthcare exemption card, and people with the cards often did not clearly understand their 
entitlements. Inadequate targeting was a major factor in the inefficient distribution of social 
assistance during times of crisis. 
 
In practice, officials in the provinces, districts and communes are still grappling with the 
transition from the ‘input-output’ planning system inherited from the days of central 
planning. PAR has often combined attempts to improve effectiveness by technical 
measures, such as with procedures, as well as changes in practice and management seeking 
to move from a philosophy of ‘resourced delivery’, or ‘program implementation’ to active 
policy development based upon problem identification.  
 
The process has involved enhanced responsibilities for local government officials to 
promote efficient economic growth and design and implement poverty reduction schemes. 
However, the capacity of these officials to effectively take on these new responsibilities is 
still seen as weak. The transition to a more decentralised way of working from the previous 
top-down model has been slow and ineffective in responding to cross-cutting issues in a 
timely way. The period of transition has been characterized by increased landlessness, 
problems of economic growth, and problems of human development among the Khmer 
ethnic minority, together with unresolved gender issues. Thus the pressures to shift to a 
focus of attention upon identification of problems and development of suitable policies, 
rather than program implementation, are increasing.  
 
NTP-HEPR is a much more complex programme than P 135 with a large number of 
separately administered sub-programmes (versus the lump sum nature of funding 
communes in P 135, which makes it theoretically clearer and easier to monitor). Funding 
allocations are not transparent and there are insufficient mechanisms and criteria to 
determine that funds are being spent as intended and reaching the desired households. This 
implies that the programme should be simplified and resource allocation should be more 
transparent.  
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There has been a lack of coordination of efforts to implement the decentralization of NTP-
HEPR. Decentralisation has resulted in reforms to the budgetary process with provinces 
given control over funds allocated from NTP-HEPR. Many provinces are not following the 
implementation guidelines outlined by line ministries responsible for the different sub-
programmes. These provinces are using programme funds to resolve local problems and not 
national objectives, which makes it difficult to monitor the performance of the programme.  
 
A major problem is that there has been no budget allocation to implement a monitoring and 
evaluation system, which has resulted in quite a high level of leakage and inefficient 
allocation of resources. Transparency and access to information about the programme 
budget is mainly at central and provincial levels. District, commune and local communities 
are not informed about budget.  
 
In the provinces, the process to allocate funds to lower levels is particularly slow. Some 
provinces take six months to allocate budget to district and commune levels. This causes 
delays in the implementation of the programme, limits the impact, and sometimes projects 
are abandoned before completion.  
 
Financial management mechanisms have focused on allocations from central budget and 
not promoted the development of the range of the investment resources including the 
private sector and the mobilisation of resources from the community. The lack of 
community contributions reflects their limited participation in identifying, implementation 
and monitoring of NTP-HEPR activities.  
 
Management of programme budget in the provinces is not clear. Data on the budget for 
NTP-HEPR is integrated in the final financial reports of districts and provinces. There is 
not separate budget allocation of monitoring NTP-HEPR, and so the quality of financial 
reports at district and provincial levels is low. This makes it difficult for financial 
management agencies to update data on programme expenditure. The Department of 
Finance can not collect data to calculate the financial status of the different sub-
programmes.  
 
Capacity of NTP-HEPR officials and financial management staff is quite limited. Most 
commune accountants have only completed basic or intermediate training courses on 
accounting and expenditure reports are not submitted on time or accurately updated. 
 
Central and provincial allocations are recorded and controlled by the Treasury system and 
so leakage of funds is limited by exerted control over disbursement and acquittal. However, 
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contributions by households to NTP-HEPR (whether in cash or in kind) and donor agencies 
are not recorded at district and commune levels. This means that there is a large amount of 
money in the system which can not be accounted, which increases the potential for leakage.  
In addition, it is not clear what these contributions are used. Villagers are not confident that 
their financial contributions are used for the intended purpose and so are reluctant to 
contribute.  
 
In NTP-HEPR, most leakage occurs in the procurement process for public capital works. 
Infrastructure and housing are constructed using local contractors. This has advantages, 
contractors can be mobilised quickly, local labour opportunities are generated and it 
stimulates the local economy. However, there are significant disadvantages. The criteria for 
the selection of contractors are not transparent, bids are often inflated and there is a lack of 
effective quality control and accountability, as well as the potential for corruption. 
Resolution of these problems involves community supervision and implementation 
combined with the willingness of officials to respond to community reports and complaints.   
 
7. The geographic/ethnic coverage and gender orientation of the NTP  
 
MoLISA has identified 17 priority provinces that will be an initial focus of NTP-HEPR 
activities for 2006-2010. The content of these activities is not clear. The provinces include 
Cao Bang, Bac Kan, Lai Chau, Dien Bien, Son La, Hoa Binh, Ha Giang, Yen Bai, Quang 
Nam, Quang Ngai, Quang Tri, Dac Lac, Dac Nong, Gia Lai, Kon Tum, Hau Giang and Soc 
Trang7. In general these are very poor provinces, although the selection of the communes 
within these provinces will have a large impact on how well poverty is targeted.   
 
During the period 2000-2005, the poverty targeting of some sub-programmes was better in 
the poor and mountainous regions such as North West, North East, and Central Highlands. 
See higher coverage and targeting rates of the sub-programmes by regions in Table 1 to 
Table 8. The coverage rate to poor households and targeting rate to them was also higher 
for ethnic minorities than for the Kinh/Chinese ethnic groups as shown in Table 9.  
 
Women are mainly employed in agriculture. While they make up 50% of the labour force, 
they earn only 40% of total wage remuneration. In agriculture, women’s wages are 62% of 
men’s, but they work on average 6 to 8 hours more a day because they do the majority of 
                                                 
7
 MOLISA has a plan to ‘roll out’ or ‘push down’ the NTP-HEPR to the 17 provinces.  The selection criteria 
for the provinces was not clear and so it is uncertain if investment in this programme is the best use of 
resources in targeting the poor. Also, implementation modalities have not been identified.  
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the housework. Women often and typically lack power within the household. The study 
indicated that, although women were the money managers in the household, they did not 
have the power to make decisions on expenditure.  
 
Beyond the household, women have limited influence in community decisions. The ratio of 
female leaders to male leaders in the political system is low across all administrative levels 
but lowest at the commune level. Women’s heavy workloads often cause or exacerbate 
health problems and their lack of access to local decisions has resulted in limited access to 
health services. For example, ante-natal and post-natal services are almost non-existent in 
many remote villages. The heavy workload also limits access to education and as a result 
literacy is lower than that of men. 
 
It is often assumed that disadvantage due to gender is not a serious problem in Vietnam, 
particularly in activities of infrastructure development or community management. 
However, it is also common that women do not participate actively in village meetings, 
other than via the presence of the representative of the Vietnamese Women’s Union. We 
cannot assume that women, young or old, or ethnic minorities will all have the same 
opinion regarding plans or impacts, unless we ask them. It is important to train commune 
members in gender issues, and to disaggregate data by age, gender and ethnic status, when 
monitoring activities. 
 
Access to improved health, education and water and sanitation is likely to have a positive 
impact particularly on women and children. It will be important to monitor that improved 
access to subsidised credit and land will be equally available to all poor persons, 
irrespective of gender – this is particularly tied to registration of women as owners of land 
in red book issuance.  
 
Training in agriculture, forestry and fisheries has traditionally been more available to men - 
due to cultural factors and the location or timing of the courses. This is particularly an issue 
for ethnic women, who often lack Vietnamese language fluency, and for cultural reasons 
are less able to assert themselves. They are also often doing the heavy labouring work and 
therefore not available during training times. Consequently, those providing training in 
these practical skills should bear gender and ethnicity in mind when planning the training – 
plan to deliver very practical skills via demonstrations, preferably in the village, minimise 
written content and ensure that it is simple and easily understood, consider the gender of 
potential participants and their commitments – alterations in timing of courses may improve 
the gender balance. 
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8. The quality of the monitoring arrangements 
 
Monitoring is still very weak because the cooperation has not been clearly regulated 
between ministries and other central agencies with steering committees and sectoral 
departments at provincial level.  This problem is exacerbated by the lack of an effective 
reporting system. Most provinces do not report budget and implementation plans to MPI of 
MoF, which makes it difficult to monitor performance and revise strategic plans. The result 
is a lack of coordination of implementation with budget resources. Often needs in the 
provinces change during the implementation process but budget allocations are not able to 
be revised to respond to the changes.  
 
Line ministries implementing sub-programmes have not developed criteria to evaluate 
results, particularly the efficiency of the programme. As a result, each province has 
developed its own method for programme evaluation. This makes it difficult to analyse 
results and formulate policies.  
 
There is no clear mechanism for the People’s Inspection Boards and Project Supervision 
Boards to record their findings in reports. In addition, they only have formal monitoring 
roles for activities managed by the commune PC and not those projects managed by higher 
levels.  
 
Without quality data it is difficult to determine the overall direction of the programme and 
amend the programme during implementation if necessary. The date collected is not used 
for strategic planning but only used for reporting expenditures and physical outcomes such 
as the number of infrastructure projects constructed.  
 
In 2005, to improve the role of the community in decisions about infrastructure selection, 
implementation, supervision and monitoring the Ministry of Home Affairs issued Decision 
80 on Community Supervision of Construction. However, the impact of the decision will 
depend on the capacity of officials and institutional strengthening at commune level. It is 
worth noting that the Fatherland Front has a key role in establishing and monitoring the 
community supervision boards. This will affect its independence from state institutions. 
The Fatherland Front is a mass organisation under the direction of the Party. Province level 
has indicated that this board was not necessary, which reflects both their capacity on 
understanding the village level and their political commitment for change. Presently, the 
Party apparatus in most communes has a deciding influence over investment decisions and 
the capacity of the People’s Council and Inspectorate Board is low. These institutions are 
not functioning as the people’s advocate, which is an important part of their mandate.  
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Effective monitoring must be carried out by province and especially district level on the 
implementation of two important guidelines:  
1. Inter-ministerial guidance issued, building on existing Decisions No. 80 (on 
community supervision) and 192 (on financial transparency), to foster active 
and informed participation in program planning and implementation at 
grassroots level, and used by all provinces to develop implementation roadmaps 
with parallel capacity-building support. 
2. Inter-ministerial guidance issued concerning the establishment, planning, 
implementation and monitoring of Commune Development Funds that 
encourages active and informed participation of the poor in public investment. 
 
Consultancy work is being carried out as part of the UNDP project, VIE/02/001: Support to 
the Improvement and Implementation of the National HEPR Targeted Program, to assist 
with the development of the M&E system. This will include work on a Review of National 
M&E Systems and Operational Indicator Identification. A mission in November 2005 had 
the core objectives of: 1) presenting the draft Framework Document and Action Plan for 
critical review and feedback; 2) developing a first draft of high-level outcome indicators; 3) 
preparing guidelines for the detailed review of national M&E Systems and identification of 
operational indicators by the national team.  
 
A useful start was made, however at present it seems that the work of this consultancy is 
focussed on the high level policy and decision-makers, and to date there still appears to be 
insufficient concentration on developing workable indicators for management and 
operational levels. 
 
9. Conclusions  
 
MoLISA has identified 17 priority provinces that will be an initial focus of NTP-HEPR 
activities for 2006-2010. The content of these activities is not clear. The provinces include 
Cao Bang, Bac Kan, Lai Chau, Dien Bien, Son La, Hoa Binh, Ha Giang, Yen Bai, Quang 
Nam, Quang Ngai, Quang Tri, Dac Lac, Dac Nong, Gia Lai, Kon Tum, Hau Giang and Soc 
Trang. The criteria for selecting these provinces is not clear. The list of provinces was sent 
to MOLISA from the Office of Government in November 2005 after it reviewed the project 
document for 2006-2010. However, many of the provinces are at the bottom of the list of 
provinces in Vietnam according to the UNDP’s rating of provinces in relation to 
implementing the MDGs. The provinces are also characterised by slow economic growth 
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and human development, they have not made the best of opportunities and not used the 
funds from the national programmes in the most efficient way.    
 
Main modality to support NTP-HEPR is the UNDP project. This project has been 
characterized by slow decision-making and implementation processes. In 2006, the project 
focus will be creating a forum for experience sharing and coordination, infuse this 
experience into the new programme and coordinate TA. It will not be a leading agency in 
developing policy advice and implementation guidelines for MOLISA on issues such as the 
implementation of the Labour Law in villages and guidelines for its application when 
villagers contribute labour to infrastructure construction.      
 
Inequality is increasing between rich and poor and rural and urban. In short, economic 
growth benefited government officials, small businesses and wealthy households involved 
in production, while the landless, households coping with illness and health problems had 
become poorer and weaker in their ability to cope with shocks. 
 
Risks include: 
• The new programme has been broadly outlined but there are no implementation 
guidelines and so it is not possible to assess if direct budget support is an option.  
• Lack of concrete plans to collect baseline data and information and establish an 
effective M&E system with budget.  
• Capacity building activities delayed or not fully implemented due to insufficient in-
country capacity for qualitative and quantitative delivery of large capacity building 
programmes 
• Pilot-testing of different components delayed because of lack of implementation 
guidelines  
• Financial tracking system not effectively in place before initial disbursements.  
• The capacity building plan is not developed in readiness for the start of the 
programme  
• The new programme does not effectively implement demand responsive processes. 
Community priorities are not selected for investment. 
 
There are Technical Working Groups under MoLISA working on a range of topics 
including, financial mechanisms, monitoring and evaluation, capacity building and 
vocational training, infrastructure, livelihood development, targeting mechanisms and 
improving access to social services.  UNDP has also provided support (along with funding 
from several donors, including Finland) to support the development of the NTP-HEPR (and 
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SEDEMA). To date, however, though the programme document has been presented 
officially by the Prime Minister, progress to develop the fine details and review the 
procedures with potential donors has been slow. Consequently the programme still remains 
somewhat of a grey area. 
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List of Tables 
 
Table 1: Poverty targeting of the policy on exemption for agricultural land use tax (for crop-growing 
households) 
 
Regions 2002 
Coverage to poor 
households (%) 
Coverage to food 
poor households 
(%)  
% of poor 
households over 
beneficiaries 
1. Red River Delta 17.8 33.7 66.1 
2. North East 24.0 34.5 80.3 
3. North West 29.4 34.8 94.0 
4. North Central Coast 29.4 44.4 83.1 
5. South Central Coast 23.2 37.4 76.7 
6. Central Highlands 28.9 41.1 88.4 
7. North East South 19.3 33.1 50.8 
8. Mekong River Delta 18.3 30.7 53.6 
All Vietnam 23.7 37.6 75.1 
Note:  
(1) The second column gives the estimate of the percentage of the crop-growing households 
who were exempted for the land use tax over the poor households (and of course also crop-
growing households). The third column presents a similar figure but the denominator is the 
total number of the crop-growing and food poor households (estimates in the second and 
third columns are called coverage rates). The final column estimates the percentage of the 
poor households among the households who received the exemption (so-called targeting 
rate8).  
(2) No information in VHLSS 2004 
Source: Authors’ estimation from VHLSS 2002 
 
 
Table 2: Poverty targeting of the program on reduction and exemption for education fee (for 
households who have someone attending school) 
 
Regions 2002 2004 
Coverage to 
poor 
households 
(%)  
Coverage to 
food poor 
households 
(%) 
% of poor 
households 
over 
beneficiaries 
Coverage to 
poor 
households 
(%)  
Coverage to 
food poor 
households 
(%)  
% of poor 
households 
over 
beneficiaries 
1. Red River Delta 9.0 17.7 54.7 15.7 14.9 31.3 
2. North East 36.5 48.0 63.4 48.6 61.4 55.1 
3. North West 35.6 39.6 77.7 56.9 59.0 69.6 
4. North Central Coast 20.0 28.6 68.3 31.8 49.4 65.2 
5. South Central Coast 28.6 48.8 68.7 38.4 64.0 57.8 
6. Central Highlands 50.5 58.5 70.4 86.3 96.9 56.1 
7. North East South 30.1 44.6 38.2 56.3 83.4 21.7 
8. Mekong River Delta 28.6 34.2 52.2 35.5 54.6 34.6 
All Vietnam 26.8 38.8 61.6 40.8 58.5 48.7 
Note: The definition of the columns is similar to that in Table 1 
Source: Authors’ estimation from VHLSS 2002-2004 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
8
 In fact, the rate that is equal to 100 minus this rate is called the leakage rate. This indicator measures the percentage of 
the non-poor households but receiving the program over the total number of the program recipients.    
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Table 3: Poverty targeting on the program on provision of free healthcare insurance card 
 
Regions 2002 2004 
Coverage to 
poor 
households 
(%) 
Coverage to 
food poor 
households 
(%)  
% of poor 
households 
over 
beneficiaries 
Coverage to 
poor 
households 
(%)  
Coverage to 
food poor 
households 
(%)  
% of poor 
households 
over 
beneficiaries 
1. Red River Delta 9.3 19.6 65.8 17.9 25.4 38.1 
2. North East 7.8 11.4 79.7 29.9 39.4 50.8 
3. North West 16.0 20.6 94.3 49.0 52.2 66.6 
4. North Central Coast 10.1 14.5 80.0 20.8 25.5 59.9 
5. South Central Coast 15.4 19.4 63.8 26.5 47.6 51.8 
6. Central Highlands 8.6 14.0 87.0 30.2 27.4 50.9 
7. North East South 12.5 17.0 28.4 20.4 24.4 14.7 
8. Mekong River Delta 9.5 16.8 63.4 10.1 17.9 24.4 
All Vietnam 10.2 16.0 66.6 23.5 33.0 44.9 
Note: The definition of the columns is similar to that in Table 1 
Source: Authors’ estimation from VHLSS 2002-2004 
 
 
Table 4: Poverty targeting on the program on support to housing construction and repairs  
 
Regions 2002 2004 
Coverage to 
poor 
households 
(%)  
Coverage to 
food poor 
households 
(%)  
% of poor 
households 
over 
beneficiaries 
Coverage to 
poor 
households 
(%)  
Coverage to 
food poor 
households 
(%)  
% of poor 
households 
over 
beneficiaries 
1. Red River Delta 0.9 2.1 81.7 2.4 4.9 100.0 
2. North East 0.7 1.0 90.2 5.2 10.2 66.8 
3. North West 1.5 2.0 95.3 2.9 3.0 83.6 
4. North Central Coast 1.9 1.8 79.0 3.0 4.7 81.1 
5. South Central Coast 2.1 2.9 60.0 1.4 1.9 27.3 
6. Central Highlands 2.1 2.2 98.6 2.2 1.5 58.6 
7. North East South 2.6 5.4 50.1 5.2 12.5 24.8 
8. Mekong River Delta 2.2 5.7 52.0 3.7 7.2 31.6 
All Vietnam 1.6 2.5 69.0 3.3 5.3 52.0 
Note: The definition of the columns is similar to that in Table 1 
Source: Authors’ estimation from VHLSS 2002-2004 
 
 
Table 5: Poverty targeting on the program on provision of preferential credit  
 
Regions 2002 2004 
Coverage to 
poor 
households 
(%)  
Coverage to 
food poor 
households 
(%)  
% of poor 
households 
over 
beneficiaries 
Coverage to 
poor 
households 
(%)  
Coverage to 
food poor 
households 
(%)  
% of poor 
households 
over 
beneficiaries 
1. Red River Delta 3.3 5.3 79.3 15.2 17.1 24.2 
2. North East 8.5 12.6 79.8 27.9 40.8 42.8 
3. North West 4.8 5.6 98.7 32.3 30.9 47.3 
4. North Central Coast 9.2 11.6 77.3 19.9 30.0 44.4 
5. South Central Coast 2.5 4.3 48.6 16.5 22.1 12.5 
6. Central Highlands 3.5 4.9 85.8 12.8 13.8 34.3 
7. North East South 5.5 8.5 39.6 21.0 11.8 14.3 
8. Mekong River Delta 3.8 3.6 55.3 17.1 29.0 23.9 
All Vietnam 5.5 7.7 71.2 20.2 27.7 30.1 
Note: The definition of the columns is similar to that in Table 1 
Source: Authors’ estimation from VHLSS 2002-2004 
 30
Table 6: Average of loan during the past 12 months for the recipients of the preferential credit (VND 
thousand in price of 2002) 
 
Regions 2002 2004 
Non-Poor Poor Total Non-Poor Poor Total 
1. Red River Delta 1687.0 2017.4 1948.9 3309.3 3211.1 3285.5 
2. North East 2863.0 2528.2 2595.8 4965.8 3338.0 4269.3 
3. North West 1500.0 2955.5 2936.8 4646.0 2809.1 3778.1 
4. North Central Coast 2662.3 2127.0 2248.4 4518.8 2284.4 3527.4 
5. South Central Coast 3341.1 2231.3 2801.3 5725.3 2572.2 5330.2 
6. Central Highlands 2000.0 2751.6 2644.6 8011.0 3499.3 6464.2 
7. North East South 2934.4 2965.0 2946.5 6459.6 4432.7 6170.8 
8. Mekong River Delta 2222.2 2454.1 2350.4 4951.3 2448.6 4354.0 
All Vietnam 2611.8 2364.7 2435.9 5007.1 2926.8 4381.9 
Source: Authors’ estimation from VHLSS 2002-2004 
 
 
Table 7: Percentages of agricultural households attending meetings on agricultural extension 
 
Regions 2004 
Coverage to 
poor households 
(%) 
Coverage to 
food poor 
households (%)  
% of poor 
households over 
beneficiaries 
1. Red River Delta 36.1 19.3 13.8 
2. North East 50.8 58.3 31.5 
3. North West 47.8 43.6 66.4 
4. North Central Coast 41.7 33.2 33.2 
5. South Central Coast 39.1 50.6 26.2 
6. Central Highlands 21.4 22.3 30.7 
7. North East South 16.7 9.6 8.7 
8. Mekong River Delta 14.8 14.6 9.4 
All Vietnam 36.4 35.6 23.5 
Note: (1) No information in VHLSS 2002 
          (2) The definition of the columns is similar to that in Table 1 
Source: Authors’ estimation from VHLSS 2004 
 
 
Table 8: Percentages of agricultural households who were visited by agricultural staffs to provide 
agricultural extension  
 
Regions 2004 
Coverage to 
poor households 
(%) 
Coverage to 
food poor 
households (%)  
% of poor 
households over 
beneficiaries 
1. Red River Delta 8.2 9.4 14.5 
2. North East 12.2 16.8 31.2 
3. North West 8.6 9.6 52.9 
4. North Central Coast 8.0 5.2 32.0 
5. South Central Coast 10.3 13.3 30.7 
6. Central Highlands 4.1 4.2 26.3 
7. North East South 1.0 0.0 2.8 
8. Mekong River Delta 3.3 7.1 8.1 
All Vietnam 7.8 8.9 22.5 
Note: (1) No information in VHLSS 2002 
          (2) The definition of the columns is similar to that in Table 1 
Source: Authors’ estimation from VHLSS 2004 
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Table 9: Poverty targeting of several HEPR programs by ethnicity 
 
Ethnicity 2002 2004 
Coverage to 
poor 
households  
Coverage to  
food poor 
households  
% of poor 
households 
over 
beneficiaries 
Coverage to 
poor 
households  
Coverage to  
food poor 
households  
% of poor 
households 
over 
beneficiaries 
Exemption agricultural land use tax 
Kinh/Chinese 20.6 35.0 67.3    
Ethnic minorities 32.2 41.3 92.4    
All Vietnam 24.0 37.9 75.4    
Reduction and exemption for education fee  
Kinh/Chinese 16.9 23.4 52.5 24.9 39.8 34.9 
Ethnic minorities 52.9 58.4 72.2 68.6 73.2 65.1 
All Vietnam 26.8 38.8 61.6 40.8 58.5 48.7 
Provision of free healthcare insurance card  
Kinh/Chinese 10.1 17.2 60.3 15.2 21.5 32.1 
Ethnic minorities 10.6 14.4 92.0 39.9 43.4 64.0 
All Vietnam 10.2 16.0 66.6 23.5 33.0 44.9 
Housing support 
Kinh/Chinese 1.6 2.6 62.6 2.9 5.1 43.1 
Ethnic minorities 1.6 2.3 96.1 4.1 5.5 73.1 
All Vietnam 1.6 2.5 69.0 3.3 5.3 52.0 
Provision for preferential credit 
Kinh/Chinese 5.5 8.3 66.2 17.4 26.3 22.5 
Ethnic minorities 5.6 7.0 89.6 26.1 29.2 58.2 
All Vietnam 5.5 7.7 71.2 20.2 27.7 30.1 
Attending meetings on agricultural extension (for agricultural households) 
Kinh/Chinese    30.9 25.0 15.7 
Ethnic minorities    46.1 44.9 57.6 
All Vietnam    36.4 35.6 23.5 
Visit of agricultural staffs to provide agricultural extension (for agricultural households) 
Kinh/Chinese    6.8 6.4 15.4 
Ethnic minorities    9.7 11.2 53.3 
All Vietnam    7.8 8.9 22.5 
Note: (1) Empty cell because of no information from the corresponding survey.  
         (2) The definition of the columns is similar to that in Table 1 
Source: Authors’ estimation from VHLSS 2002-2004 
 
 
Table 10: Percentage of communes which have different projects during 2002-2004 by poverty 
status in 2002 (commune panel data) 
Non-poor 
and poor 
communes 
Percentage of communes which have 
Employment 
generation 
Poverty 
reduction 
Infrastructure 
and economic 
development 
Culture and 
eduction 
Healthcare 
and public 
health 
Environment 
and clean 
water 
Non-poor 27.3 50.6 56.2 25.2 15.1 13.9 
Poor 22.4 59.6 70.3 39.7 18.9 16.7 
Total 25.8 53.3 60.5 29.6 16.3 14.7 
Note: Poor communes are defined as the 30th percentiles of communes which had the highest poverty rate 
in 2002. The poverty rate is estimated by the commune authority according to MOLISA poverty line. 
Source: Authors’ estimation from VHLSS 2002-2004 
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Table 11: Number of household observations participating in several programs in panel data 2002-
2004 
 
Recipients Reduction and 
exemption for 
education fee 
Provision of 
Healthcare 
insurance card 
Support to 
housing 
construction 
and repairs 
Provision of 
preferential 
credit 
Attending 
meetings on 
agricultural 
extension 
Visit of agr. 
staffs to 
provide agr. 
extension 
Non-Poor 197 176 18 150 726 168 
Poor 295 239 23 109 399 92 
Total 492 415 41 259 1,125 260 
Source: Authors’ estimation from VHLSS 2002-2004 
 
 
Table 12: Average change in expenditure per capita among the participants in several programs 
(real price in January 2002) 
 
Recipients Expenditure per 
capita in 2002 
Expenditure per 
capita in 2004 
Absolute change in 
exp. 2002-2004 
percentage change 
in exp. 2002-2004 
(1) (2) (3) (4)=(3)-(2) (5)=100*(4)/(2) 
Reduction and exemption for education fee 
Non-Poor 2978.0 3071.2 93.2 7.5 
Poor 1362.2 1728.0 365.8 29.1 
Total 1982.1 2243.4 261.2 20.8 
Provision of Healthcare insurance card 
Non-Poor 3264.5 3375.5 111.0 8.9 
Poor 1366.7 1653.3 286.7 22.0 
Total 2170.2 2382.5 212.3 16.4 
Support to housing construction and repairs 
Non-Poor 3316.5 3366.8 50.3 5.9 
Poor 1361.6 1517.3 155.6 16.4 
Total 2273.9 2380.4 106.5 11.5 
Provision of preferential credit 
Non-Poor 3043.0 3469.7 426.7 17.2 
Poor 1426.3 1789.7 363.4 26.1 
Total 2340.5 2739.7 399.2 21.1 
Attending meetings on agricultural extension 
Non-Poor 3191.0 3638.2 447.2 19.9 
Poor 1476.3 1997.4 521.1 36.7 
Total 2565.1 3039.3 474.2 26.0 
Visit of agr. staffs to provide agr. Extension 
Non-Poor 3257.1 3785.2 528.1 24.2 
Poor 1537.4 1981.9 444.5 28.7 
Total 2620.2 3117.4 497.1 25.9 
Source: Authors’ estimation from VHLSS 2002-2004 
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Table 13: Changes in expenditure per capita among the participants and non-participants 
households (real price in January 2002) 
 
 
Recipients Expenditure per 
capita in 2002 
Expenditure per 
capita in 2004 
Absolute change in 
exp. 2002-2004 
percentage change in 
exp. 2002-2004 
(1) (2) (3) (4)=(3)-(2) (5)=100*(4)/(2) 
Reduction and exemption for education fee 
Non-Participants 3595.3 4176.2 580.9 26.4 
Participants 1982.1 2243.4 261.2 20.8 
Total 3372.9 3909.7 536.8 25.6 
Provision of Healthcare insurance card 
Non-Participants 3510.5 4084.4 573.9 26.7 
Participants 2170.2 2382.5 212.3 16.4 
Total 3372.9 3909.7 536.8 25.6 
Support to housing construction and repairs 
Non-Participants 3383.7 3924.8 541.0 25.8 
Participants 2273.9 2380.4 106.5 11.5 
Total 3372.9 3909.7 536.8 25.6 
Provision of preferential credit 
Non-Participants 2985.1 3516.9 531.8 26.9 
Participants 2340.5 2739.7 399.2 21.1 
Total 2895.4 3408.8 513.3 26.1 
Attending meetings on agricultural extension 
Non-Participants 3722.1 4285.9 563.9 25.5 
Participants 2565.1 3039.3 474.2 26.0 
Total 3372.9 3909.7 536.8 25.6 
Visit of agr. staffs to provide agr. Extension 
Non-Participants 3427.2 3966.9 539.7 25.6 
Participants 2620.2 3117.4 497.1 25.9 
Total 3372.9 3909.7 536.8 25.6 
Source: Authors’ estimation from VHLSS 2002-2004 
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Table 14: Changes in poverty rate among the participants and non-participants households 
 
Recipients Poverty rate in 2002 Poverty rate in 2004 Absolute change in  
2002-2004 
(1) (2) (3) (4)=(3)-(2) 
Reduction and exemption for education fee 
Non-Participants 22.7 15.4 7.3 
Participants 61.6 51.7 9.9 
Total 28.1 20.4 7.6 
Provision of Healthcare insurance card 
Non-Participants 24.7 17.0 7.6 
Participants 57.7 50.2 7.4 
Total 28.1 20.4 7.6 
Support to housing construction and repairs 
Non-Participants 27.8 20.1 7.7 
Participants 53.3 51.3 2.1 
Total 28.1 20.4 7.6 
Provision of preferential credit 
Non-Participants 29.0 21.6 7.4 
Participants 43.5 37.0 6.5 
Total 31.0 23.7 7.3 
Attending meetings on agricultural extension 
Non-Participants 24.4 18.5 6.0 
Participants 36.5 25.0 11.5 
Total 28.1 20.4 7.6 
Visit of agr. staffs to provide agr. extension 
Non-Participants 27.4 20.1 7.3 
Participants 37.0 24.6 12.4 
Total 28.1 20.4 7.6 
Source: Authors’ estimation from VHLSS 2002-2004 
 
 
Table 15: Change in commune infrastructures over 2002-2004 (commune panel data) 
 
Percentage of 
communes which 
have: 
2002 2004 Change 
during 
2002-2004 
(1) (2) (3) (4)=(3)-(2) 
With car road    
Non-poor 86.1 96.6 10.4 
Poor 81.7 94.6 12.9 
Total 84.8 96.0 11.2 
With electricity    
Non-poor 97.3 98.1 0.8 
Poor 80.1 92.4 12.3 
Total 92.1 96.4 4.3 
With healthcare centers   
Non-poor 99.0 99.7 0.7 
Poor 100.0 100.0 0.0 
Total 99.3 99.8 0.5 
Source: Authors’ estimation from VHLSS 2002-2004 
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Table 16: Change in commune off-farm employment opportunities over 2002-2004 (commune panel 
data) 
 
Percentage of 
communes which 
have: 
2002 2004 Change during 
2002-2004 
(1) (2) (3) (4)=(3)-(2) 
Non-farm enterprises/traditional villages within commune 
Non-poor 41.7 56.4 14.7 
Poor 26.2 41.0 14.8 
Total 37.0 51.7 14.7 
Non-farm enterprises/traditional villages using commune labor 
Non-poor 55.4 68.3 12.9 
Poor 33.1 40.1 6.9 
Total 48.7 59.8 11.1 
Number of commune labors in these enterprises/traditional villages 
Non-poor 85.0 268.2 183.1 
Poor 23.1 142.4 119.3 
Total 66.3 242.7 176.4 
Source: Authors’ estimation from VHLSS 2002-2004 
 
 
Table 17: Main reasons for increases in welfare during the past 5 years (qualitative assessment by 
the commune authorities) 
 
Communes Agricultural 
Income 
Non-agricultural 
Income 
Infrastructure 
improvement 
Social changes 
(education, 
healthcare, 
service) 
Others (price 
change, 
weather, 
calamities, etc.) 
Poorest 89.9 57.8 65.6 29.6 21.3 
Near poorest 89.4 71.3 60.1 19.5 17.7 
Middle 90.8 77.8 49.8 18.6 17.2 
Near richest 86.9 82.6 55.0 16.3 15.1 
Richest 82.3 83.0 55.4 17.2 19.3 
Total 87.9 74.5 57.2 20.2 18.1 
Source: Authors’ estimation from VHLSS 2004 
 
 
Table 18: Distribution of the chairman of the commune people committee by highest education 
degree  
 
Highest Education 
 2002   2004  
Non-poor 
communes 
Poor 
communes 
Total 
communes 
Non-poor 
communes 
Poor 
communes 
Total 
communes 
No degree 0.0 1.9 0.6 0.0 0.9 0.26 
Primary 5.6 14.8 8.3 1.3 5.5 2.61 
Lower secondary 29.6 39.3 32.5 23.9 36.9 27.9 
Lower secondary and 
above 64.8 44.1 58.7 74.8 56.8 69.23 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Source: Authors’ estimation from VHLSS 2002-2004 
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Table 19: Distribution of the deputy chairman of the commune people committee by highest 
education degree  
 
Highest Education 
 2002   2004  
Non-poor 
communes 
Poor 
communes 
Total 
communes 
Non-poor 
communes 
Poor 
communes 
Total 
communes 
No degree 0.0 2.7 0.8 0.2 0.0 0.14 
Primary 6.5 17.4 9.8 1.0 5.5 2.26 
Lower secondary 34.4 42.0 36.7 20.6 39.7 25.95 
Lower secondary and 
above 59.1 37.9 52.7 78.2 54.8 71.65 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Source: Authors’ estimation from VHLSS 2002-2004 
 
 
 
 
 
